innerslytherin: (civil war cannon)
[personal profile] innerslytherin
The following is a rather lengthy entry, part book review, part history lesson, part reflection, about modern warfare and the US as a military power. It's relevant not only to the Iraq war but also the situation in Darfur. Because as Santayana said, those who don't study the past...

I just finished reading Black Hawk Down by Mark Bowden. The book is about the largely-overlooked Battle of Mogadishu (The Battle of the Black Sea), which happened in 1994--my senior year in high school. The battle took place just a couple of weeks before my seventeenth birthday, and the majority of the men participating in that battle were very close to my age.


Operation Restore Hope, Operation Gothic Serpent, and Task Force Ranger
UN peacekeeping forces had been in Somalia since 1992, where they were conducting Operation Restore Hope in an attempt to end the famine and restore order. They were attempting to feed people, but the civil war made it difficult as various warlords seized the food for their troops rather than allowing it to feed the hungry. Mohamed Farrah Aidid was the primary warlord, in charge of the Habr Gidr Clan, and had been demanding withdrawal of UN forces.

In May, Aidid and UN troops were in disarmament talks. In June, 24 Pakistani troops were ambushed and killed by the Somalis. In July, US Cobra gunships fired into a house where Habr Gidr soldiers were believed to be meeting; it turned out that some 70 clan elders, rather than soldiers, were killed in that attack. Four journalists were mobbed and murdered by rioting Somalis in retaliation. In August, Task Force Ranger was deployed to Somalia. Their mission was to capture Aidid and arrest as many of his top-level supporters as they could.


The Battle of Mogadishu
By October 3 they'd already completed six missions uneventfully. The Black Hawk and Little Birds helicopter pilots had flown nightly over the city. Word came that they had two high-level targets to be arrested. The Rangers and Delta boys would rope in from Black Hawks, capture the targets, and drive them out in trucks and HUMVEEs. It was expected to take an hour, tops.

Instead, the Somalis reacted faster than had been expected, and in staggeringly huge numbers. They used Rocket-Propelled Grenades and shot down two Black Hawks. The ground convoy, with the successfully captured prisoners onboard, spent several hours wandering the streets of Mogadishu trying to get to the Super Six One, the first crash site. A second rescue convoy was unable to get through the narrow, often-barricaded streets because of heavy small-arms fire and RPGs. The second crash site, Super Six Four, was overrun by Somalis and all Americans killed except Mike Durant, the pilot, who was taken prisoner.

(It was men from Super Six Four whose bodies were dragged through the streets by the Somalis. I still vividly remember that footage and the horror and outrage it inspired. Among those dead were two Delta snipers who volunteered to be inserted by helicopter despite being badly outnumbered.)

The Rangers and Delta men were effectively pinned down in the middle of a hostile city for the night. By midnight a third rescue convoy had been assembled, made up of US, Pakistani, and Malaysian troops. The Pakistanis and Malaysians had heavy armor, though, which was difficult to maneuver in the narrow streets, and the drivers delayed the convoy's progress by refusing to drive through barricades, which had to be dismantled by hand.

When the rescue convoy finally arrived, just before sunrise, the Americans were able to load their wounded into vehicles, then they were left behind by the foreign drivers. They had to fight their way back through the area they'd come through the day before. The dismounted troops finally arrived at the rendezvous point, and from there they had to run along side the personnel carriers until they reached Pakistani Stadium, where the 10th Mountain was waiting to treat the wounded.


Casualties

In the end, 18 Rangers and Delta Force men were killed, and another 70-some were injured. President Clinton decided to end the mission following the battle, though time was spent building a show of force to intimidate Aidid into giving back Mike Durant (which he did). The US got a bloodied nose and pulled out of Somalia entirely, leaving the country to its civil war. Aidid was killed a few years later, and his death didn't stop the conflict.

A couple of years ago I had a discussion with someone who was all worked up about Rwanda and couldn't understand why the US didn't do anything to stop the genocide there. I tried to tell her about Somalia, but she didn't seem to get it. In his epilogue, Mark Bowden speaks to the impact of Somalia as well--the lessons to be taken away, and the questions it raises.


"It was a watershed," says one State Department official.... "The idea used to be that terrible countries were terrible because good, decent, innocent people were being oppressed by evil, thuggish leaders. Somalia changed that. Here you have a country where just about everybody is caught up in hatred and fighting. You stop an old lady on the street and ask her if she wants peace, and she'll say yes, of course, I pray for it daily. All the things you'd expect her to say. Then ask her if she would be willing for her clan to share power with another in order to have that peace, and she'll say, 'With those murderers and thieves? I'd die first.' People in these countries--Bosnia is a more recent example--don't want peace. They want victory. They want power. Men, women, old and young. Somalia was the experience that taught us that people in these places bear much of the responsibility for things being the way they are. The hatred and killing continues because they want it to. Or because they don't want peace enough to stop it" (410).


It was, Bowden says, what stopped America and the UN from stepping in to stop the genocide in Rwanda and Zaire. It was what kept us looking on from the sidelines at the atrocities in Bosnia. In fact, he adds, people in Washington made noise about never again getting US troops involved in a UN mission (410). America was demoralized by what happened in Somalia, for much the same reason, and for much less cause, as we were demoralized about Vietnam. We had seen it all on our televisions, and we were afraid of getting stuck in a quagmire.

In his Afterword, Bowden goes on to say that the battle sheds some light on "the predicament of being an American at the turn of the century" (426). America has great military and political power--but doesn't responsibility come along with that power? Shouldn't we seek to end suffering where we can?

President Bush committed the United States to the mission, and [Clinton's] decision to nation-build once the famine ended was the perfectly logical out-growth of that policy. The famine in Somalia had not been caused by a natural disaster; it was man-made, a result of cynical, feuding warlords deliberately using starvation as a weapon. It would not have made much sense to simply walk away after delivering food for a few weeks or months and allow the crisis to renew. There were those (they seem prescient in retrospect) who argued that there are limits to what America can accomplish, but if the United States erred in overreaching, it was for laudable reasons. Our intervention begged the central issue: As the world's only military superpower, should we stand by and let terrible human tragedies unfold? Aren't we morally obligated to do something? And in this age of instant global communication, there isn't much that happens in the world that Americans don't witness, in color, in our living rooms (426-7).


I don't have any answers to the predicament of being American. I know it often gets us looked on with scorn, hatred, or annoyance. I know we're often perceived as being arrogant. And sometimes it does feel arrogant to say that we should go and plant little mini-Americas, complete with Jeffersonian democracy, in cultures that aren't used to operating that way. But don't we have a responsibility to keep people from brutally murdering each other? Shouldn't we protect the Kurds from Saddam? Shouldn't we stop the brutality in Darfur?

Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War
The book itself was a fascinating, well-written, riveting account of the battle, and Bowden received a great deal of cooperation from those involved while writing it. He has been overwhelmed with thanks from the soldiers who were there, and has spoken to elite military groups across the US, as well as the CIA. Just the fact that I read a non-fiction book of 430+ pages in less than a week says a lot about the quality of writing and the level at which it engages you. Of course, it also helped that it was a battle I remember taking place, and spawned a movie that I've seen more than once. In any case, I would highly recommend the book to anyone who has an interest in military history, US foreign policy, or Africa.

Date: 2008-04-27 11:38 pm (UTC)
From: [identity profile] spin1978.livejournal.com
I remember reading Black Hawk Down not long after it came out in print (and saw a couple of the original Philadelphia Inquirer series that spawned it). It is one of my favorite non-fiction books and always recommend it to people. One of the common criticisms I hear is that there's not enough context in terms of the history and politics going on at the time. I believe that this is one of its strengths - it allows us to focus on what we, as a society, may ask our military, which is composed of our family and friends, to do in our name. We are then able to ask, "Is it worth it?"

One of the most important things that we can do is to continue to serve as a model of a reasonably free and democratic republican-style government. We've kept it going, uninterrupted, for over 200 years. Every two years we permit a peaceable and civil "regime change" to a certain extent (U.S. House of Rep. every two years, Senate seats staggered to 1/3 of the chamber every two years, President every four years). We haven't had to overhaul our entire government (what number are the French on now, the Sixth Republic?) every so often - very rarely we tack on an amendment to the Constitution and the number of pages of federal code is, I'm guessing, pretty intimidating.

The perils of serving as a model is that we run the risk of inspiring revolution and reform in a country, previously gripped in the clutches of an oppressive junta or in other political dire straits, that decides its new, democratically-flavored government is going to not necessarily agree with us. Just because we are the model does not make us the detailed blueprint. That is not reason for sword-rattling or other undiplomatic gestures from the outset. (Of course, if they snub us, we are entitled to snub them - it's par for the course.) We talk, we play hardball if they want to play hardball, and we hope that our example will eventually inspire them to become amenable to our position.

I'm still not sure there's a right way to intervening in places where there is rampant genocide and brutality that won't backfire. On the one hand, the capacity to stop it is likely in the grasp of our military. It may not be pretty, but we can most likely put out a fire. But how do we make sure it doesn't happen again there? There's a quote by Lawrence of Arabia about it being better that instead of us British Westerners doing the work in an ideal manner we let the people who actually live there do it in their own way, which may only appear to be tolerable to our eyes. The dilemma here is that we send in overwhelming military force, but do we simply then back off?

I always figure the quality of a book is proportional to the discussion it inspires. BHD is one of the great non-fiction books in a good long while, I'd say.

ETA - sorry about that delete, accidentally striked out a bunch of text by accident. Whoops....

Date: 2008-04-27 11:48 pm (UTC)
From: [identity profile] rhynny.livejournal.com
"I'm still not sure there's a right way to intervening in places where there is rampant genocide and brutality that won't backfire. On the one hand, the capacity to stop it is likely in the grasp of our military. It may not be pretty, but we can most likely put out a fire."

there is no right way, but theres the human way. Intervening in Genocide before and during its course is always a boon to humanity imo, with or without the politics...i reccomend reading Gen. Romeo Dallaire's book "Shake Hands with the Devil".

Date: 2008-04-28 12:00 am (UTC)
From: [identity profile] spin1978.livejournal.com
I didn't know that General Dallaire wrote a book. I'll have to check that out.

I agree that the human way is to intervene to stop it, regardless of the politics. I think the question then is how to ensure that the problem does not flare up once military forces are withdrawn/drawn down. That is where the politics come most strongly into play, for better and worse.

Date: 2008-04-28 12:25 am (UTC)
From: [identity profile] rhynny.livejournal.com
its true interventionism does not always work, most of the time foreign presence just aggravates the situation. but with the increasing trend towards liberalization, interventionist policies are bound to stick around for some time. thats why the role of the UN and other regional organizations and their increasing cooperation should be of higher priority. just coz its better to ask the locals to intervene when needed especially if they already know the local variables, but at the same time OVERSIGHT and constant communication to and from the UN is essential as well. they're working on that now...

Date: 2008-04-28 12:32 am (UTC)
From: [identity profile] rhynny.livejournal.com
i get the feeling you might be thinking in terms of just the US shouldering the conflict management around the world. there is no real 'safe' in military operations, thats obvious, even peacekeeping forces get killed, there is an inherent danger always. its a risk. but if one encourage strengthening regional ties and their peacekeeping abilities most probably America (who admittedly is the bulk of the UN PK forces) won't have to carry the burden for much longer.

Date: 2008-04-29 12:29 am (UTC)
From: [identity profile] spin1978.livejournal.com
The people who mentioned that they would have preferred more historical/political context probably would like the movie to have been 10 minutes of action and 110 minutes of historical flashback, international politics, and documentary-style commentary.

....even though we had expected we could arrest him and pop up a democracy in his place.

This is the crux of my concerns about committing military force above - what we really want to do is stop the bloodshed and bring the perpetrators to justice, as well make sure the area is stable enough to remain peaceable without UN/NATO/US/Other military forces around.

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